Unpacking the Iggerot: What’s in a Name?

Moshe Kurtz Tradition Online | June 5, 2025

Read more about “Unpacking the Iggerot” and see the archive of all past columns.

Unpacking the Iggerot: What’s in a Name? / Iggerot Moshe, O.H., vol. 4, #66

Summarizing the Iggerot
May observant Jews call their children by non-Jewish names? What even is the proper delineation between a Jewish and a non-Jewish name? These are the issues that R. Moshe Feinstein reckons with when he was asked in late 1979 whether one may name his daughter after his late mother’s “foreign name” (shemot la’az).

R. Feinstein replies that even though “foreign names” are not desirable, they are not in contravention of any formal halakhic strictures. He notes that throughout the ages non-Jewish names found their way into the Jewish naming pool—to a point that some had even become recognized as typical Jewish names. He points to Rambam, R. Moshe son of Maimon, whose illustrious father bore a foreign name. Going even further back to the Sages of the Talmud, we are acquainted with many names that might raise our eyebrows, such as R. Papa, R. Zvid, Mar Zutra, Mar Kashisha, and Mar Yanuka—and the Rabbinic corpus raises no objection to it. (Though he notes that, perhaps, Aramaic is unique as even works of the Bible, such as Daniel, are written in Aramaic. Mystics also appear to ascribe a unique status to this language vis-a-vis the angels.)

Based on this, R. Feinstein rules that as a matter of honoring this soon-to-be-father’s obligation to honor his mother and the dignity of the family, it would be appropriate for him to name his daughter after her deceased grandmother. (Though, because she had died at an early age, R. Feinstein suggests that they should only take one of her names and append the name of a righteous woman from the Torah, like Hannah.) However, he stipulates that absent such circumstances, it would be best to bestow a purely Hebrew name.

At the end of the responsum, R. Feinstein cites the midrashic teaching that the Jewish people were redeemed from Egypt on account of maintaining unique identifiers, such as their Jewish names (Vayikra Rabba, #32). He asserts, however, that such measures were only necessary prior to receiving the Torah; subsequent to receiving the Torah the true mark of a Jew is not a name or article of clothing but his or her observance of the 613 commandments. Nonetheless, he qualifies: “And even though this is reasonable, I am afraid to say it without strong evidence.”

Connecting the Iggerot
About a year later, R. Feinstein issued a responsum (Iggerot Moshe, O.H., vol. 5, #10:1) in which he expanded on his position regarding non-Jewish names. Turning once again to Rambam as his model, he points out how the great medieval authority published both his commentary on Mishnah as well as his Guide for the Perplexed in Judeo-Arabic—perhaps demonstrating that Judaism is comfortable operating in local languages and that the jump to using local names is not as radical as one might think. (The Mishneh Torah was an original Hebrew work so as to maintain the Rabbinic formulations that it was codifying.) Nonetheless, he notes that both French and Ashkenazic Torah scholars generally ensured that their works of Talmudic scholarship were written in Rabbinic Hebrew.

The inquirer had apparently proposed that despite the fact that certain non-Jewish names were adopted by Jews, the conscientious among us always ensured that even those foreign names were distinct from their gentile neighbors. R. Feinstein finds this to be an unrealistic stretch and responds: “Behold, the truth is not so [as you claim], and it is not possible to use theoretical propositions to change the facts.”

R. Chaim Mintz reports that the same reasoning was applied when a man offered to sell pins for Jewish schoolchildren to wear displaying their Hebrew names. R. Feinstein turned down the offer, as he consistently maintained that post-Sinai insisting on distinct Jewish names was not a priority in the way it was for the Hebrew slaves in Egypt. Reportedly, he also did not appreciate that someone was trying to profit off the stringency (Zkeinekha Yomru Lakh, p. 113).

Reception of the Iggerot
Some poskim sought to poke holes in R. Feinstein’s relatively permissive responsum. For instance, R. Asher Weiss (Minhat Asher 24:12 [Shemot 5778]) questions how R. Feinstein’s ruling does not appear to account for foreign names which have begun to creep their way in without having yet been fully accepted. In theory, if they are caught early enough they ought to be rejected from the Jewish naming pool.

To fully appreciate the relatively liberal nature of R. Feinstein’s ruling, we have to contextualize it within the prevailing ethos of the yeshiva world. Take, for example, R. Yeruchem Lebovitz, who asserts in his Da’at Torah (Exodus 15:1; cf. Haggadah shel Pesach be-Ikvot ha-Mashgiah de-Mir, pp. 190-191) that the purpose of our ancestors in Egypt maintaining distinct clothing, language, and names was so that there would not be “even a strand of connection” to their surrounding culture. Many ideological leaders in the traditional yeshiva world extrapolate from this the basis for absolute cultural distinction and egually relevent today as it wa sin Egypt of old. For R. Feinstein to come along and dismiss the relevance of such a Jewish-cultural marker bucks the prevailing wisdom in the more conservative elements of the Orthodox world.

Reflecting on the Iggerot
However, portraying R. Feinstein’s approach as liberal may very well be a superficial mischaracterization. If we look closely, he does not simply dismiss the significance of distinct Jewish names—he argues that they are of peripheral significance because the true identity of a Jew is predicated on his submission and adherence to the mitzvot of the Torah. Indeed, he even goes so far as to suggest that it was prominently the Torah study of our ancestors which sustained them in Egypt (see Kol Ram, vol. 1, p. 263).

In Dibberot Moshe (Ketubot, pp. 71-72), he elucidates the seemingly superfluous repetition found in the Mishnah in Avot (3:14):

Beloved are Israel in that they were called children to the All-Present. Especially beloved are they for it was made known to them that they are called children of the All-Present, as it is said: “You are children to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 14:1). Beloved are Israel in that a precious vessel [i.e. the Torah] was given to them. Especially beloved are they for it was made known to them that the desirable instrument, with which the world had been created, was given to them, as it is said: “For I give you good instruction; forsake not my teaching” (Proverbs 4:2).

R. Feinstein expounds that the Mishnah’s first statement refers to our becoming children to God as the Jewish nation. But our national identity was only truly realized when we received the “precious vessel” which imbued us with an additional level of sanctity. Having distinct clothing, names, and language was necessary when we were just “called children of the All-Present,” but once we received the Torah that became the core identifier of the Jewish people, thereby rendering other forms of identification secondary at best. We may add that this could also be, perhaps, an unstated rationale in his dispensation for removing a kippa when necessary in the workplace (Iggerot Moshe, O.H., vol. 4, #2). He only looks at the strict halakha which regards a kippa as a minhag, while seemingly glossing over its broader Jewish-cultural significance, which enables him to provide a relatively lenient ruling (see our earlier column, Kippa on the Job).

While it would be nice to end our story here, if we return to R. Feinstein’s second responsum (O.H., vol. 5, #10:4-5) we find some significant limitations on how far he was actually willing to go. While intially he encouraged the soon-to-be father to name his daughter after his deceased mother’s foreign name, in this responsum he firmly rejects the notion that a child would be bound to go by it should they wish to use a Hebrew name instead.

Moreover, not all Hebrew names are created equal. To name a child Arye (lion), Dov (bear), or Zev (wolf) are possibly no better than their Yiddish alternatives Leib, Ber, and Wolff, “for only names which are found [to be used] in Scriptures may be considered to have the quality of sanctity.” While one is not halakhically required to use a Jewish name, if they are endeavoring to opt for the most ideal choice, one should choose Menahem and Manoah over Mendel and Hendel. (Though R. Feinstein, of course, had no say in the matter, we may note that his saintly mother was named Faya Gittel, which appears on his memorial stone).

However, the true moment the rug gets pulled from beneath our feet is when he returns to his de-emphasis on Jewish names post-Sinai. Right at the end of the lengthy responsum, just before signing off, he writes “But really I wrote this idea to be explored theoretically, and not for [general] practical guidance.” While in his first responsum he expressed hesitancy to make an assertion without strong evidence, it would seem from his second responsum that his hesitance may have developed into a partial retraction. This echoes what we observed in our previous column about his stance on the Borough Park eruv and will also occur again in our next article on Artificial Insemination.

Endnote: See Mesoret Moshe (vol. 1, pp. 599-600) where he presents a teaching similar to what we point to from Dibberot Moshe above. Regarding the use of non-Hebrew names in divorce documents, see Iggerot Moshe (O.H., vol. 5, #10:2) and Mesoret Moshe (vol. 1, pp. 430-435).

Moshe Kurtz is the incoming rabbi of Cong. Sons of Israel in Allentown, PA, the author of Challenging Assumptions, and hosts the Shu”T First, Ask Questions Later.

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